Abstract. Coin-tossing protocols are protocols that generate a random bit with uniform distribution, although some corrupted parties might try to bias the output. These protocols are used as a building block in many cryptographic protocols. Cleve (Proc. of the 18th ACM Symp. on the Theory of Computing, pp. 364-369, 1986) has shown that if at least half of the parties can be corrupted, then, in any r-round coin-tossing protocol, the corrupted parties can cause a bias of Ω(1/r) to the bit that the honest parties output. However, for more than two decades the best known protocols had bias t/ √ r, where t is the number of corrupted parties. Recently, in a surprising result, Moran, Naor, and Segev (Proc. of the Sixth Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009, pp. 1-18, 2009) constructed an r-round two-party coin-tossing protocol with the optimal bias of O(1/r). We extend the results of Moran et al. to the multiparty model where fewer than 2/3 of the parties are corrupted. The bias of our protocol is proportional to 1/r and doubly exponential in the gap between the number of corrupted parties and the number of honest parties in the protocol. In particular, for a constant number of parties, where fewer than 2/3 of them are corrupted. we present an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol with an optimal bias of O(1/r). Furthermore, we achieve the same bias even * A preliminary version of this work appeared in Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 2010, volume 
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation in the corrupted model allows distrustful parties to compute a function securely (e.g., compute it correctly and privately). Designing such secure protocols is a delicate task with a lot of subtleties. An interesting and basic functionality for secure computation is coin tossing-generating a random bit with uniform distribution. This is a simple task where the parties have no inputs. However, already this task raises questions of fairness and how corrupted parties can bias the output. Understanding what can be achieved for coin tossing in various settings can be considered as a step towards understanding general secure and fair multiparty computation. Indeed, some of the early works on secure computation were on coin tossing, e.g., [2, 5, 8] . Furthermore, coin tossing and its variants are used as a basic tool in constructing many protocols, e.g., the protocol of [12] . Secure protocols for coin tossing are a digital analogue of physical coin tossing, which have been used throughout history to resolve disputes.
The main problem in designing coin-tossing protocols is the prevention of a bias of the output. The bias of a coin-tossing protocol measures the maximum influence of the adversary controlling a subset of corrupted parties on the output of the honest parties, where the bias is 0 if the output is always uniformly distributed and the bias is 1/2 if the adversary can force the output to be always (say) 1. To demonstrate the problems of designing a coin-tossing protocol, we describe Blum's two-party coin-tossing protocol [5] . Example 1.1 (Blum's coin-tossing protocol [5] ). To toss a coin, Alice and Bob execute the following protocol.
• Alice chooses a random bit a and sends a commitment c = commit(a) to Bob.
• Bob chooses a random bit b and sends it to Alice.
• Alice sends the bit a to Bob together with de-commit(c).
• If Bob does not abort during the protocol, Alice outputs a ⊕ b, otherwise she outputs a random bit.
• If Alice does not abort during the protocol and c is a commitment to a, then Bob outputs a ⊕ b, otherwise he outputs a random bit.
If Alice is corrupted, then she can bias the output toward (say) 1. If a ⊕ b = 1, she opens the commitment and Bob outputs 1. However, if a ⊕ b = 0, Alice aborts, and Bob outputs 1 with probability 1/2. Altogether, the probability that the honest Bob outputs 1 is 3/4. It can be proved that this is the best that Alice can do in this protocol, and, hence, the bias of the protocol is 1/4. This protocol demonstrates the problems caused by parties aborting the protocol and the need to define how the output of the other parties is computed after such aborts.
While the above protocol is a significant improvement over naive protocols whose bias is 1/2, the protocol still has a constant bias. If more than half of the parties are honest, then, using general secure multiparty protocols, there are constant-round protocols with negligible bias (assuming a broadcast channel), e.g., the protocol of [24] . Cleve [8] proved that when at least half of the parties can be corrupted, the bias of every protocol with r rounds is Ω(1/r). In particular, this proves that without honest majority no protocol with polynomial number of rounds (in the security parameter) can have negligible bias. On the positive side, it was shown in [2, 8] that there is a two-party protocol with bias O(1/ √ r). This can be generalized to an m-party protocol that tolerates any number of corrupted parties and has bias O(t/ √ r), where t is a bound on the number of corrupted parties. Further details on the protocols of [2, 8] appear in Sect. 7. All the above-mentioned protocols and the protocols we describe below are secure against computationally bounded adversary and assume suitable cryptographic assumptions. Cleve and Impagliazzo [9] have shown that, in a weaker model compared to the model that we assume, where commitments are available only as black-box (and no other assumptions are made), the bias of every coin-tossing protocol is Ω(1/ √ r). 1 The protocols of [2, 5, 8 ] are in this model.
The question of whether or not there exists a coin-tossing protocol without an honest majority that has bias O(1/r) was open for many years. Recently, in a breakthrough result, Moran, Naor, and Segev [22] 
constructed an r-round two-party coin-tossing protocol with bias O(1/r). Moran et al. ask the following question:
"An interesting problem is to identify the optimal trade-off between the number of parties, the round complexity, and the bias. Unfortunately, it seems that several natural variations of our approach fail to extend to the case of more than two parties."
Our Results
Our main contribution is a multiparty coin-tossing protocol that has small bias when fewer than 2/3 of the parties are corrupted.
Theorem 1 (Informal).
Let n be the security parameter, and m = m(n), t = t (n), and r = r(n) be such that m/2 ≤ t < 2m/3. There exists an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol tolerating t corrupted parties that has bias O(2 2 k+1 /r ), where k = 2t − m and r = r − O(k + 1).
The above protocol nearly has the desired dependency on r, i.e., the dependency implied by the lower bound of Cleve [8] . However, its dependency on k (where k is the difference between the number of corrupted parties and the number of honest parties) has, in general, a prohibitive cost. In addition, observe that the above protocol is meaningful only when r > 2 2 k+1 , hence, the number of rounds and communication complexity of the obtained protocol is at least double exponential in k. Nevertheless, there are interesting cases where the bias is O(1/r).
Corollary 2 (Informal). Let m and t be constants (in the security parameter) such that m/2 ≤ t < 2m/3, and let r = r(n) be an integer. There exists an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol tolerating t corrupted parties that has bias O(1/r).
For example, we construct an r-round 5-party coin-tossing protocol tolerating 3 corrupted parties that has bias 8/(r − O(1)) (this follows from our general construction in Sects. [4] [5] [6] .
Notice that the protocol of Theorem 1 depends on k and not on the number of corrupted parties t. Thus, it is efficient when k is small compared to m and n.
Corollary 3 (Informal). Let n be the security parameter, and m = m(n), t = t (n), and r = r(n) be such that t = m/2 + O(1). There exists an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol tolerating t corrupted parties that has bias O(1/r).
For example, for any even m we construct an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol tolerating m/2 corrupted parties that has bias 1/(2r − O(1)). Furthermore, even when t = 0.5m + 0.5 log log m − 1, the bias of our protocol is small, namely,
O(m/(r − O(log log m))).
We also reduce the bias compared to previous protocols when at least 2/3 of the parties are corrupted. The bias of the m-party protocol of [2, 8] is O(t/ √ r). We present in Sect. 7 a protocol whose bias is O(1/ √ r) when t/m is constant, that is, when the fraction of corrupted parties is constant we get rid of the factor t in the bias.
We consider a communication model where all parties can only communicate through an authenticated broadcast channel. We assume a synchronous model; however, the adversary is rushing. We note that our results can be translated to a model with authenticated point-to-point channels with a PKI (in an m-party protocol, the translation will increase the number of rounds by a multiplicative factor of O(m)). Thus, our results hold in the two most common models for secure multiparty computation.
The Main Ideas Underlying Our Protocols
We generalize the two-party protocol of Moran et al. [22] (abbreviated as MNS protocol) to the multiparty setting. In the MNS protocol, in each round Alice and Bob obtain bits that are their output if the other party aborts: If a party aborts in round i, then the other party outputs the bit it obtained in round i − 1. Furthermore, there is a special round i * ; prior to round i * the bits obtained by Alice and Bob are random independent bits and from round i * onward the bits obtained by Alice and Bob are the same fixed bit. The adversary can bias the output only if it guesses i * .
In our protocol, in each round there are many bits that are used to compute the output when various subsets abort. We define a collection of subsets of the parties and each subset obtains a bit. The bits are chosen similarly to the MNS protocol: prior to i * they are uniform and independent; from i * onward they are fixed. In our case we cannot give the bits themselves to the parties (as in the MNS protocol). We rather use a few layers of secret-sharing schemes to allow the parties to compute each of these bits only at a particular point in time. For every subset in the collection, we use a first secretsharing scheme to share the bit of the subset among the parties of the subset. We use an additional secret-sharing scheme to share the shares of the first secret-sharing scheme. The threshold in the latter secret-sharing scheme is chosen such that the protocol can proceeds until enough parties aborted. In the round when the number of aborted parties ensures that there is an honest majority, an appropriate subset in the collection is chosen, its bit is reconstructed, and this bit is the output of the honest parties. The description of how to implement these ideas appears in Sects. 4-6. The construction of the MNS protocol is presented in two phases. In the first phase they present a protocol with a trusted dealer, for which an adversary can only inflict bias of O(1/r). Then, they show how to implement this protocol in the real world, using a constant-round secure-with-abort multiparty protocol, as well as secret-sharing and authentication schemes. This can be seen as a general transformation from any two-party coin-tossing protocol with a trusted dealer, into a real-world two-party cointossing protocol. We observe that the transformation of Moran et al. to a real-world protocol requires some further care for the multiparty case generalization. We show how this can be achieved by adopting the definition of secure multiparty computation of [1] , which requires the protocol to detect a cheating party: At the end of the protocol either the honest parties hold a correct output or all honest parties agree on a party (or parties) that cheated during the protocol.
Previous and Follow-up Works
1/p-secure protocols. Coin-tossing is an example of 1/p-secure computation. Informally, a protocol is 1/p-secure if every adversary cannot harm the protocol with probability greater than 1/p (e.g., it cannot bias the output with probability greater than 1/p). The formal definition of 1/p-secure computation appears in Definition 2.3.
Katz [20] presented a simplified version of 1/p-security called 1/p-security with abort, which is, roughly speaking, a 1/p-secure computation in which the adversary is allowed to abort in the ideal world of the execution. Katz [20] presented a protocol, for any functionality F , with full security when there is an honest majority, as well as 1/p-security with abort for any number of corrupted parties.
Gordon and Katz [17] defined 1/p-security and constructed 2-party 1/p-secure protocols for every functionality whose size of either the domain or the range of the functionality is polynomial (in the security parameter). They also show an impossibility result when both the domain and range are super-polynomial.
In a follow-up work, Beimel et al. [4] study multiparty 1/p-secure protocols for general functionalities. The main result in [4] is constructions of 1/p-secure protocols that are resilient against any number of corrupted parties provided that the number of parties is constant and the size of the range of the functionality is at most polynomial in the security parameter n. The protocols in [4] combine ideas from the protocols presented in this paper and those presented in [20] . In addition, the bias of the protocol of [4] is O(1/ √ r). Multiparty protocols for coin tossing in the preprocessing model. Ishai et al. [19] constructed a new type of secret-sharing schemes in which the reconstruction algorithm informs each honest player of the correct set of cheaters, i.e., each honest player gets a list of all the parties that input a wrong share in the reconstruction phase. This scheme can be used to convert our multiparty coin-tossing protocols into unconditional multiparty coin-tossing protocols in the preprocessing model, namely, assuming that there exists an off-line dealer which computes some values in a preprocessing phase, gives them to the parties according to the secure-with-abort model, and halts. Such a transformation eliminates the cryptographic assumptions while the bias of the resulting protocols is not effected. In addition, the impossibility result of Cleve [8] applies to the preprocessing model as well.
Organization In Sect. 2, we provide the security definitions of multiparty protocols, a description of the cryptographic tools used in this paper, and a brief overview of the MNS protocol. In Sect. 3, we present two warm-up constructions for multiparty coin tossing with bias O(1/r) where r is the number of rounds in the protocol. The first construction considers the case that at most half of the parties are corrupted (however, there is no majority of honest parties). The second construction solves the problem of coin tossing with 5 parties, where at most 3 are corrupted. In Sects. 4-6 we present our main result-a coin-tossing protocol that has nearly optimal bias and can tolerate up to 2/3 fraction of corrupted parties. In Sect. 7 we describe an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol that tolerates up to t dishonest parties, where t is some constant fraction of m.
Preliminaries
A multiparty coin-tossing protocol with m parties is defined using m probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines p 1 , . . . , p m having the security parameter 1 n as their only input. The coin-tossing computation proceeds in rounds, in each round, the parties broadcast and receive messages on a broadcast channel. The number of rounds in the protocol is typically expressed as some polynomially bounded function r in the security parameter. At the end of protocol, the (honest) parties should hold a common bit w. We denote by CoinToss() the ideal functionality that gives the honest parties the same uniformly distributed bit w, that is, Pr[w = 0] = Pr[w = 1] = 1/2. In our protocol, the output bit w might have some bias.
In this work we consider a malicious static computationally bounded adversary, i.e., a non-uniform algorithm (Turing machine) that runs in a polynomial time. The adversary is allowed to corrupt some subset of the parties. That is, before the beginning of the protocol, the adversary corrupts a subset of the parties that may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, and thereafter the adversary sees the messages sent to the corrupted parties and controls the messages sent by the corrupted parties. The honest parties follow the instructions of the protocol.
The parties communicate in a synchronous network, using only a broadcast channel. On one hand, if a party broadcasts a message, then all other parties see the same message. This ensures some consistency between the information the parties have. On the other hand, there are no private channels and all the parties see all the messages. The adversary is rushing, that is, in each round the adversary hears the messages sent by the honest parties before broadcasting the messages of the corrupted parties for this round (thus, the messages broadcast by corrupted parties can depend on the messages of the honest parties broadcast in this round). Such an adversary is the more realistic model as perfect synchronicity is hard to achieve.
The Real vs. Ideal Paradigm
The security of multiparty computation protocols is defined using the real vs. ideal paradigm [6, 11] . In this paradigm, we consider the real-world model, in which protocols are executed. We then formulate an ideal model for executing the task at hand. This ideal model involves a trusted party whose functionality captures the security requirements of the task. Finally, we show that the real-world protocol "emulates" the ideal-world protocol: For any real-life adversary A there should exist an ideal-model adversary S (also called simulator) such that the global output of an execution of the protocol with A in the real-world model is distributed similarly to the global output of running S in the ideal model. In the coin-tossing protocol, the parties do not have inputs. Thus, to simplify the definitions, we define secure computation without inputs (except for the security parameters).
The Real Model Let Π be an m-party protocol computing F . Let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary with auxiliary input aux. Let REAL Π,A(aux) (1 n ) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary (i.e., its random input and the messages it got) and the output of the honest parties, following an execution of Π , where each party p j begins by holding the input 1 n .
The Ideal Model
The basic ideal model we consider is a model without abort. Specifically, there are parties {p 1 , . . . , p m }, and an adversary S who has corrupted a subset I of them. An ideal execution for the computing F proceeds as follows:
Inputs: Party p j holds a security parameter 1 n . The adversary S has some auxiliary input aux. Trusted party sends outputs: The trusted party computes F(1 n ) with uniformly random coins computes and sends the appropriate outputs to the parties. Outputs: The honest parties output whatever they received from the trusted party, the corrupted parties output nothing, and S outputs an arbitrary probabilistic polynomialtime computable function of its view (the outputs of the corrupted parties).
Let IDEAL F ,S(aux) (1 n ) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary S in this ideal-world execution and the output of the honest parties in the execution.
In this work we consider a few formulations of the ideal world (e.g., full security and secure-with-abort), and consider composition of a few protocols, all being executed in the same real world, however, each secure with respect to a different ideal world. We prove the security of the resulting protocol, using the hybrid model techniques of Canetti [6] .
2.1.1. 1/p-Indistinguishability and 1/p-Secure Computation As explained in the introduction, the ideal functionality CoinToss() cannot be implemented when there is no honest majority. We use 1/p-secure computation, defined by [16, 20] , to capture the divergence from the ideal world. This notion applies to general secure computation. We start with some notation.
A function μ(·) is negligible if for every positive polynomial q(·) and all sufficiently large n we have μ(n) < 1/q(n). A distribution ensemble X = {X a,n } a∈{0,1} * ,n∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by a ∈ {0, 1} * and n ∈ N. Definition 2.1 (Statistical Distance and 1/p-Indistinguishability). We define the statistical distance between two random variables A and B as the function
For a function p(n), two distribution ensembles X = {X a,n } a∈{0,1} * ,n∈N and Y = {Y a,n } a∈{0,1} * ,n∈N are computationally 1/p-indistinguishable, denoted X 1/p ≈ Y , if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function μ(·) such that for every n and every a ∈ {0, 1} * ,
Two distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c ≡ Y , if for every c ∈ N they are computationally 1 n c -indistinguishable. We next define the notion of 1/p-secure computation [4, 17, 20] . The definition uses the standard real/ideal paradigm [6, 11] , except that we consider a completely fair ideal model (as typically considered in the setting of honest majority), and require only 1/pindistinguishability rather than indistinguishability.
Definition 2.2 (Perfect 1/p-Secure Computation
). An m-party protocol Π is said to perfectly 1/p-secure compute a functionality F if for every adversary A in the real model, there exists a polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that for every n ∈ N and for every aux ∈ {0, 1} *
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Definition 2.3 (1/p-Secure Computation [4, 17, 20] ). Let p = p(n) be a function. An m-party protocol Π is said to 1/p-securely compute a functionality F if for every nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model corrupting the same parties as A such that the following two distribution ensembles are computationally 1/p(n)-indistinguishable:
Remark 2.4. The definition of 1/p-secure computation allows agreement to fail with probability 1/p. In the coin-tossing functionality all (honest) parties should agree on the same bit. Our protocols achieve a slightly stronger security requirement than 1/psecurity, where the honest parties disagree on the bit only with a negligible probability (however, the bit might be biased).
We next define the notion of secure computation and notion of bias of a coin-tossing protocol by using the previous definition.
Definition 2.5 (Secure Computation
). An m-party protocol Π is said to securely compute a functionality F , if for every c ∈ N , the protocol Π is (1/n c )-securely compute the functionality F . Definition 2.6. We say that a protocol is a coin-tossing protocol with bias 1/p if it is a 1/p-secure protocol for the functionality CoinToss().
Security with Abort and Cheat Detection
We present here a definition of secure multiparty computation that is more stringent than standard definitions of secure computation with abort. This definition extends the definition for secure computation as given by Aumann and Lindell [1] . Roughly speaking, our definition requires that one of two events is possible: If at least one party deviates from the prescribed protocol, then the adversary obtains the outputs of these parties (but nothing else), and all honest parties are notified by the protocol that these parties have aborted. Otherwise, the protocol terminates normally, and all parties receive their outputs. Again, we consider the restricted case where parties hold no private inputs. The formal definition uses the real vs. ideal paradigm as discussed in Sect. 2.1. We next describe the appropriate ideal model. Inputs: Each party obtains a security parameter 1 n . The adversary A receives an auxiliary input denoted aux. Trusted party sends outputs to adversary: The trusted party computes F(1 n ) with uniformly random coins computes and sends the appropriate outputs to all parties p j such that j ∈ D. Adversary instructs the trusted party to continue or halt: A sends either a "continue" message or {"cheat j "} j ∈J to the trusted party on behalf of a set of corrupted parties indexed by J . If it sends a " continue " message, the trusted party sends the appropriate output to the parties p j for j / ∈ D (i.e., to all honest parties). Otherwise, the trusted party sends the set J to all parties p j for j / ∈ D. Outputs: An honest party always outputs the message it obtained from the trusted party. The corrupted parties output nothing. The adversary A outputs a probabilistic polynomial-time computable function of the auxiliary input aux, and the outputs obtained from the trusted party.
Execution in the Ideal
We let IDEAL (1 n ) refers to the above execution with cheat detection of F ). This ideal model is different from the ideal world without cheat detection (see, e.g., [11] ); without cheat detection, the trusted party sends a ⊥ symbol when the trusted party gets an abort message. With cheat detection, the honest parties know the identities of the corrupted parties that cause the cheat. This cheat detection is achieved by most multiparty protocols, including that of [12] , but not all (e.g., the protocol of [13] does not meet this requirement). Using this notation we define secure computation with abort and cheat detection. Definition 2.7. Let F and Π be as above. A protocol Π is said to securely compute F with abort and cheat detection if for every non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A for the real model, there exists a non-uniform polynomial-time adversary S for the ideal model corrupting the same parties as A, such that
For the simplicity of presentation, we assume that the adversarial behavior is restricted only to premature aborting. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we replace the "cheat j " message to "abort j " message. We achieve this restriction by using several cryptographic tools such as signatures.
Cryptographic Tools
We next informally describe two cryptographic tools and one standard cryptographic assumption that appear in our protocols. Formal definitions can be found in, e.g., [10, 11] .
Signature Schemes A signature on a message proves that the message was created by its presumed sender, and its content was not altered. A signature scheme is a triple (Gen, Sign, Ver) containing the key generation algorithm Gen, which gets as an input a security parameter 1 n and outputs a pair of keys, the signing key K S and the verification key K v , the signing algorithm Sign, and the verifying algorithm Ver. We assume that it is infeasible to produce signatures without holding the signing key.
Secret-Sharing Schemes
An α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme is a mechanism for sharing data among a set of parties such that every set of parties of size α can reconstruct the secret, while any smaller set knows nothing about the secret. In this paper, we use Shamir's α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme [25] . In this scheme, for every α − 1 parties, the shares of these parties are uniformly distributed and independent of the secret. Furthermore, given at most such α − 1 shares and a secret s, one can efficiently complete them to m shares of the secret s.
In order to simplify the presentation of our protocols, we construct the following threshold secret-sharing scheme with respect to a certain party. Construction 2.8. Let s be some secret taken from some finite field F. We share s among m parties with respect to a special party p j in an α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme as follows:
1. Choose shares (s (1) , s (2) ) of the secret s in a two-out-of-two secret-sharing scheme, that is, select s (1) ∈ F uniformly at random and compute s (2) = s − s (1) . Denote these shares by mask j (s) and comp (s), respectively. 2. Generate shares (λ (1) 
Output:
• The share of party p j is mask j (s). We call this share, p j 's masking share.
• The share of each party p , where = j , is comp (s). We call this share, p 's complement share.
In the above, we shared the secret s among the parties in P in a secret-sharing scheme such that any set of size at least α that contains p j can reconstruct the secret. In addition, similarly to the Shamir secret-sharing scheme, the following property holds: for any set of β < α parties (regardless if the set contains p j ), the shares of these parties are uniformly distributed and independent of the secret. Furthermore, given such β < α shares and a secret s, one can efficiently complete them to m shares of the secret s and efficiently select uniformly at random one vector of shares completing the β shares to m shares of the secret s.
Trapdoor Permutations A trapdoor permutation is a collection of permutations that (1) are easy to compute, (2) hard to invert in polynomial time, and, (3) are easy to invert given some additional key. The existence of trapdoor permutations is a standard cryptographic assumption and it is used in achieving many cryptographic constructions, e.g., public key encryption and oblivious transfer. In Appendix A, we explain that they can be used to construct the multiparty constant-round secure-with-abort protocols that we use in our protocols.
For completeness, we next give an informal definition of trapdoor (one way) permutations. A collection of trapdoor permutations is a set F = {f i : D i → D i } i∈I where I is a set of finite indices and for every i ∈ I , f i is a permutation such that (1) (Easy to sample function) There exists a probabilistic polynomial time (abbreviated as PPT) algorithm Gen which on input 1 n outputs (i, t i ) where t i is the trapdoor of i, (2) (Easy to sample domain) There exists a PPT algorithm which on input i ∈ I outputs x ∈ D i , (3) (Easy to evaluate function) There exists a PPT algorithm A which on inputs i ∈ I and x ∈ D i , computes A(i, x) = f i (x), (4) (Hard to invert) Every PPT algorithm fails to invert y = f i (x), i where x ∈ D i with a noticeable probability, and (5) (Easy to invert when trapdoor is known) There exists a PPT algorithm B such that B(i, t i , f i (x)) = x.
The Two-Party Protocol of Moran et al.
Moran, Naor, and Segev [22] present a two-party coin-tossing protocol with an optimal bias with respect to the round complexity (i.e., meeting the lower bound of Cleve [8] ). The MNS protocol uses some of the ideas presented in early works on fairness, e.g., [14, 15, 18, 20] . We next briefly review the MNS protocol, which later serves as the basis for our construction. Following the presentation of the MNS protocol, we first describe a construction that uses an on-line trusted party called the dealer. Later, we describe how the dealer can be eliminated.
The main underlying idea is that the dealer chooses a special round during which the parties actually unknowingly learn the output of the protocol. If the adversary guesses this round, it can bias the output by aborting. If the adversary aborts (or behaves maliciously) in any other time, then there is no bias. However, this special round is uniformly selected (out of r possible rounds) and then concealed such that the adversary is unable to guess it with probability exceeding 1/r. Therefore, the bias of the protocol is O(1/r).
More specifically, for two parties Alice and Bob to jointly toss a random coin, the protocol proceeds as follows. In a preprocessing phase, the dealer selects a special round number i * ∈ {1, . . . , r}, uniformly at random, and selects bits a 1 , . . . , a i * −1 , b 1 , . . . , b i * −1 , independently and uniformly at random. It then uniformly selects a bit w ∈ {0, 1} and sets a i = b i = w for all i * ≤ i ≤ r. Thereafter, the protocol proceeds in rounds: In round i, the dealer gives Alice the bit a i and Bob the bit b i . If none of the parties abort, then at the end of the protocol both output a r = b r = w. If a party prematurely aborts in some round i, the honest party outputs the bit it received in the previous round (i.e., a i−1 or b i−1 respectively). If one party aborts before the other party received its first bit (i.e., a 1 or b 1 ), then the other party outputs a random bit.
The security of the protocol follows from the fact that, unless the adversary aborts in round i * , it cannot bias the output of the protocol. The view of any of the parties up to round i < i * is independent of the value of i * , hence, any adversary corrupting a single party can guess i * with probability at most 1/r.
To eliminate the trusted party, Moran et al. first turn the trusted party from an online dealer into an off-line dealer, i.e., one that computes some values in a preprocessing phase, gives them to the parties, and halts. To achieve this, they use a 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing scheme and an authentication scheme. The trusted party selects i * , bits a 1 , . . . , a i * −1 , b 1 , . . . , b i * −1 , and a bit w ∈ {0, 1} as before. It then selects random shares for a i and b i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. That is, it selects uniformly at random a An adversary cannot forge with noticeable probability an authentication tag, and is, thus, essentially limited to aborting in deviating from the prescribed protocol.
The off-line dealer is then replaced by the (constant-round) secure-with-abort twoparty protocol of [21] for computing the preprocessing functionality. That is, at the end of the initialization protocol, the parties obtain the authenticated shares of the a i 's and the b i 's, while the underlying i * stays secret. The security of the 2-party preprocessing protocol guarantees that a polynomial-time adversary is essentially as powerful as in a computation with an off-line dealer.
Coin Tossing with a Dishonest Majority-A Warm-Up
In this section we present two warm-up constructions of multiparty coin-tossing protocols with bias O(1/r) where r is the number of rounds in the protocol. The first construction considers the case that at most half of the parties are corrupted (however, there is no majority of honest parties). The second construction solves the problem of coin tossing with 5 parties, where at most 3 are corrupted. These two protocols demonstrate the main difficulties in constructing multiparty coin-tossing protocols with a dishonest majority, alongside the techniques we use to overcome these difficulties. In Sects. 4-6, we present a construction for the general case that combines ideas from the two constructions presented in this section.
The main issue of any coin-tossing protocol is how to deal with premature aborts. The protocol must instruct any large enough subset of parties (i.e., at least as large as the set of honest parties) how to jointly reconstruct a bit if all other parties abort the protocol. Since there is no honest majority, an adversary controlling some set of parties can compute the output of this set assuming that the other parties abort. The problem in designing a protocol is how to ensure that this information does not enable the adversary to bias the output.
We stress that constructing fair coin-tossing protocols assuming a trusted dealer is an easy task, e.g., the trusted party can choose a random bit and send it to each party. However, when considering a rushing adversary, one cannot eliminate the trusted party in this protocol. The coin-tossing protocols we describe below are designed such that it is possible to transform them to protocols with no trusted party.
Multiparty Coin Tossing when Half of the Parties are Corrupted
In this section we present a protocol with an optimal (up to a small constant) bias with respect to round complexity, when up to half the parties may be corrupted. We next give an informal description of the protocol with an on-line trusted party who acts as a dealer. In this protocol, the parties simulate the MNS protocol. That is, we partition the parties into two sets A and B, one will simulate Alice and the other will simulate Bob. The main difficulty is that the adversary is not restricted to corrupting parties only in one of these sets. To overcome this problem, in our partition A contains a single party p 1 , and the set B contains the parties p 2 , . . . , p m . If the adversary corrupts p 1 , it gains full access to the view of Alice in the 2-party protocol; however, in this case a strict majority of the parties simulating Bob is honest, and the adversary will gain no information about the bits of Bob, i.e., the b i 's.
We next describe the protocol. We assume for simplicity that m is even. In a preprocessing phase, the dealer uniformly selects i * ∈ {1, . . . , r} and then uniformly and independently selects a 1 , . . . , a i * −1 , b 1 , . . . , b i * −1 . Finally, it uniformly selects w ∈ {0, 1} and sets a i = b i = w for all i * ≤ i ≤ r. In each round i, the dealer sends a i to A, selects random shares of b i in Shamir's m/2-out-of-(m − 1) secret-sharing scheme, and sends each share to the appropriate party in B. We stress that formally (to model a rushing adversary), the dealer first sends the corrupted parties their messages, allows them to abort, and proceeds as described below.
During the execution, some parties might abort; we say that a party is active if it has not aborted. If a party p j prematurely aborts, then the trusted party notifies all currently active parties that p j has aborted. We next describe the actions when a party aborts:
• If p 1 aborts in round i, then the parties in B reconstruct b i−1 , output it, and halt.
In this case, since p 1 is corrupted, at least m/2 honest parties exist in B and, thus, they will be able to reconstruct the output.
• If in round i fewer than m/2 active parties remain in B, then p 1 broadcasts a i−1
to the remaining parties in B and all (honest) parties output a i−1 and halt. In this case p 1 must be honest, and hence, can be trusted to broadcast a i−1 .
• While there are still at least m/2 active parties in B (i.e., at most m/2 − 1 of them abort) and p 1 is active, the protocol proceeds without a change.
If the last round of the protocol is completed, i.e., p 1 got a r and there are at least m/2 active parties in B that got the corresponding shares of b r , then p 1 outputs a r and the active parties in B reconstruct and output b r . To prevent cheating, the dealer needs to sign the messages given to the parties in B (in our protocols we use signatures and not authentication as in the MNS protocol since if a corrupted party sends an incorrect share we need all honest parties to know this). We omit these details in this subsection.
Recall that at most m/2 out of the m parties are corrupted. Thus, if p 1 is corrupted, then at most (m/2) − 1 parties in B are corrupted, and they cannot reconstruct b i . The argument that the above protocol is O(1/r)-secure is now straightforward. An adversary wishing to bias the protocol must cause premature termination. To do so, it must either corrupt p 1 (and gain no information on the b i 's) or otherwise corrupt m/2 parties in B (hence, leaving p 1 uncorrupted). Thus, for any adversary in the multiparty protocol there is an adversary corrupting Alice or Bob in the two-party protocol with dealer of the MNS protocol that is, essentially, as powerful. An important feature that we exploit in our protocol is the fact that in the two-party protocol Bob does not need its bit b i−1 if Alice does not abort. Thus, in our protocol the parties in B do not reconstruct b i−1 unless p 1 aborts in round i.
More work is required in order to eliminate the trusted dealer; the details are a special case of those described in Sect. 6. In the above protocol, we partitioned the parties to two sets: {p 1 } and {p 2 , . . . , p m } and associate a bit to each set. In the general case, we associate bits to subsets; however, the construction is more involved.
Remark 3.1. Our choice to partition the parties into a singleton and a set of size m − 1 is not the only one possible, and similar ideas would work with any partition of the m parties into two odd-sized disjoint sets. The key observation to be made is that the sets A and B can use |A|/2 -out-of-|A| and |B|/2 -out-of-|B| secret sharing of the whole computation of Alice and Bob from the MNS protocol, respectively.
If the corrupted parties of either sets reconstruct a secret of the set, then we necessarily have an honest majority in the other set. Furthermore, in the event of premature abort of the majority of parties in one set, the (honest) majority in the other set can complete the execution of the protocol.
A 5-Party Protocol that Tolerates up to 3 Corrupted Parties
In this section we consider the case where m = 5 and t = 3, i.e., a 5-party protocol where up to 3 of the parties may be corrupted. The protocol we present in this section is inferior compared to the protocol in Sects. 4-6. As in previous protocols, we first sketch our construction assuming there is a special on-line trusted dealer. This dealer interacts with the parties in rounds, sharing bits to subsets of parties, and proceeds with the normal execution as long as at least 4 of the parties are still active.
Denote the trusted dealer by T and the parties by p 1 , . . . , p 5 . In this protocol, for each interaction round, the dealer produces a bit for each one of the 10 possible sets of three parties; this bit is recovered if a premature termination of at least 2 parties occurs. Formally, for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , 5} such that |J | = 3, denote P J = {p j : j ∈ J } and by σ i J a bit to be recovered by 2 or 3 active parties in P J if the protocol terminates in round i + 1. In a preprocessing phase, the dealer T selects uniformly at random i * ∈ {1, . . . , r}, indicating the special round in this five-party protocol. Then, for every 0 ≤ i < i * it selects σ i J independently and uniformly at random for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , 5} such that |J | = 3. Finally, it independently and uniformly selects a random bit w and sets σ i J = w, for every i ∈ {i * , . . . , r} and for every set J ⊂ {1, . . . , 5} such that |J | = 3.
The dealer T interacts with p 1 , . . . , p 5 in rounds, where round i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r consists of three phases as described below. These phases describe the activity of a rushing adversary in one communication round. Furthermore, for modeling a rushing adversary we assume that the dealer knows the identities of the corrupted parties. In Sect. 3.2.1 we remove this assumption and the dealer.
The peeking phase. The dealer sends to the adversary all the bits σ i J such that there is a majority of corrupted parties in P J , i.e., at least 2 parties p j such that j ∈ J are controlled by the adversary. If after r rounds, there are at least 4 active parties, T simply sends w to all active parties and the honest parties output this bit. As an example of a possible execution of the protocol, assume that p 1 aborts in round 4 and p 3 and p 4 abort in round 37. In this case, T sends σ 36 {1,2,5} to p 2 and p 5 , which output this bit.
Recall that the adversary obtains the bit of the set of size three of parties indexed by J L if at least two parties in P J are corrupted. If the adversary causes the dealer to halt, then, either there are two remaining active parties, both of them must be honest, or there are three active parties and at most one of them is corrupted. In either case, the adversary does not know σ i−1 J in advance. Furthermore, the dealer reveals the appropriate bit σ i−1 J to the active parties. Jumping ahead, these properties are later preserved in a real-world protocol by using a 2-out-of-3 secret-sharing scheme.
We next argue that any adversary can bias the output of the above protocol by at most O(1/r). As in the MNS protocol, the adversary can only bias the output by causing the protocol to terminate in round i * . In contrast to the MNS protocol, in our protocol if in some round there are two bits σ i J and σ i J that the adversary can obtain such that σ i J = σ i J , then the adversary can deduce that i = i * . However, there are at most 7 bits that the adversary can obtain in each round (i.e., the bits of sets P J containing at least two corrupted parties). For a round i such that i < i * , the probability that all these bits are equal to (say) 0 is 2 −7 . Such rounds are indistinguishable to the adversary from round i * . Intuitively, the best an adversary can do is guess one of these rounds, and therefore cannot succeed guessing with probability better than 2 −7 . Thus, the bias the adversary can cause is 2 7 /r. This intuition is proved in Claim 5.5 (Lemma 2 from [17] ). 2 The reason for requiring that the dealer does not continue when at least two parties abort will become clear when we transform the protocol to a protocol with an off-line dealer.
Eliminating the Dealer for the 5-Party Protocol
We eliminate the trusted on-line dealer in a few steps using a few layers of secret-sharing schemes. First, we change the on-line dealer, so that in each round i it shares the bit σ i J among the parties in P J using a 2-out-of-3 secret-sharing scheme-called inner secretsharing scheme. In fact, the dealer first signs the bit share to prevent cheating. The same requirements on σ i J as in the above protocol are preserved using this inner secret-sharing scheme. That is, the adversary is able to obtain information on σ i J only if it controls at least two of the parties in P J . On the other hand, if the adversary does not control at least two parties in some P J (i.e., there is an honest majority in P J ), then, in round i, the honest parties can reconstruct σ i−1 J (if so instructed by the protocol). Next we turn the on-line dealer into an off-line dealer. That is, we show that it is possible for the dealer to only interact with the parties once, sending each party some input, so that thereafter, the parties interact in rounds (without the dealer) and in each round i each party learns its shares in the ith inner secret-sharing scheme. That is, in each round i, each party p j learns a share of σ i J in a 2-out-of-3 secret-sharing scheme, for every set J such that |J | = 3 and j ∈ J . For this purpose, the dealer shares, in a preprocessing phase, the appropriate shares for the inner secret-sharing scheme using a 4-out-of-5 secret-sharing scheme with respect to p j as defined in Construction 2.8. We call the resulting secret-sharing scheme the outer scheme.
The use of the 4-out-of-5 secret-sharing scheme plays a crucial role in eliminating the on-line dealer. It guarantees that an adversary, corrupting at most three parties, cannot reconstruct the shares of round i before round i. However, if at least two parties do not reveal their shares, then they prevent a reconstruction of the outer scheme (this is why we cannot proceed after 2 parties aborted); in this case there is an honest majority among the active parties. Hence, the protocol proceeds normally as long as at least 4 parties are active. If, indeed, at least two parties abort (in round i), then the remaining parties use their shares of the inner scheme to reconstruct the bit σ i−1 J L for the appropriate set J L of size three.
To prevent corrupted parties from cheating, by say, sending false shares and causing reconstruction of wrong secrets, every message that a party should send during the execution of the protocol is signed in the preprocessing phase (together with the appropriate round number and with the party's index). Furthermore, all shares in the inner secretsharing scheme are signed (as they are used as messages if reconstruction is required). In addition, the dealer sends a verification key to each of the parties. To conclude, the off-line dealer gives each party the signed shares for the outer secret-sharing scheme together with the verification key. A formal description of the functionality of the off-line dealer, called ShareGenForFive r , is given in Fig. 1 . In order to simplify the presentation, we use slightly different notations compared to the notations used in the presentation of the general construction in Sects. 4-6. The protocol with the off-line dealer proceeds in rounds. In round i of the protocol, all parties broadcast their (signed) shares in the outer (4-out-of-5) secret-sharing scheme. Thereafter, each party can unmask the message it receives (with its share in the appropriate 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing scheme) to obtain its signed shares in the 2-outof-3 sharing of the bits σ i J (for the appropriate sets J 's such that |J | = 3 for which the party belongs). If a party stops broadcasting messages or broadcasts improperly signed Functionality ShareGenForFive r Notations: 1 n -the security parameter and r = r(n) -the number of rounds in the protocol. Computing default bits and signing keys 1. Choose w ∈ {0, 1} and i * ∈ {1, . . . , r} uniformly at random. 2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , 5} such that |J | = 3, (a) if i ≤ i * − 1, then choose independently and uniformly at random σ i J ∈ {0, 1}. • The messages M j,1 , . . . , M j,r that p j broadcasts during the protocol.
• p j 's private masks mask j (R i,J j ) which were produced in Step (5) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r and each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , 5} such that |J | = 3 and j ∈ J . messages, then all other parties consider it as aborted and will ignore all messages it will send in the future. If two or more parties abort, the remaining parties reconstruct the bit of the lexicographically first set of size three that contains all of them, as described above. In the special case of premature termination already in the first round, the remaining parties engage in a fully secure protocol (with honest majority) to toss a completely random coin. In Fig. 2 we formally define the 5-party coin-tossing protocol tolerating up to 3 corrupted parties.
Finally, we replace the off-line dealer by using a secure-with-abort protocol with cheat detection (see Sect. 2.2) computing the functionality computed by the dealer, that is, Functionality ShareGenForFive r . Obtaining the outputs of this computation, an adversary is unable to infer any information regarding the output of the coin-tossing pro-A 5-party protocol FivePartyCoinToss r Notations: 1 n -the security parameter and r = r(n) -the number of rounds in the protocol.
Joint input: Security parameter 1 n .
Preliminary phase:
• The parties engage in a secure-with-abort and cheat-detection protocol in order to computing the functionality ShareGenForFive r . If a single party aborts, then this phase is repeated. This may happen at most twice before an honest majority is guaranteed. If at least two parties aborted (and detected), the parties use multiparty secure computation (with full security) to toss a fair coin, output this resulting bit, and halt.
In each round i = 1, . . . , r do: • If i = 1 (i.e., the parties aborted during the first round), then the active parties use a multiparty secure protocol (with full security) to toss a fair coin, output this resulting bit, and halt.
• Otherwise, the active parties reconstruct the bit σ
where J L is the lexicographically first set of size three that contains all the indices of the active parties, output it, and halt.
At the end of round r: Each active party p j broadcasts the signed share R r,J j , for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , 5} such that |J | = 3 and j ∈ J , in order to reconstruct σ r J = w. All honest parties output w. tocol (as the functionality does not give any information to an adversary controlling at most 3 parties). The adversary, however, can prevent the execution, at the price of at least one corrupted party being detected by all other parties. In such an event, the remaining parties will start over. This can go on at most twice, before there is a honest majority and a completely fair coin can be obtained. The details of this final step are given in Sect. 6. Remark 3.2. The above construction can be generalized in a straightforward manner to any number m of parties and any number t of corrupted parties such that t < 2m/3. In the generalized construction, there is a bit for every set Q of size t; the outer secretsharing scheme is a (t + 1)-out-of-m scheme and the inner secret-sharing scheme is an (m − t)-out-of-t scheme. The bias of the resulting protocol is much higher compared to the protocol described in Sects. 4-6, which uses a better way for distributing bits to subsets. The bias of the generalized protocol and the protocol presented in Sects. 4-6 is O(2 α /r), where α is the number of bits the adversary sees. In the protocol presented in Sects. 4-6, α = 2 k+1 . We can show that in the generalized protocol α is much higher, that is, α > (m − t)2 k . Therefore, the bias of the protocol is much higher than 2 (m−t)2 k /r.
Our Main Construction
In Sects. 4-6 we present our main result-a coin-tossing protocol that has nearly optimal bias and can tolerate up to 2/3 fraction of corrupted parties. More specifically, we prove the following theorem. In the above theorem, k is the difference between the number of corrupted parties and the number of honest parties, i.e., k = t − (m − t) = 2t − m. For example, if t = m/2, then the number of honest and corrupted parties are equal and k = 0. Furthermore, for concreteness the theorem assumes that trapdoor permutations exist. We can replace this assumption with an assumption that implies a constant-round secure-with-abort with cheat detection exists.
Following the MNS protocol, we describe our protocol in two steps. In Sect. 5, we describe Protocol CTWithD r that uses an online trusted party, called dealer. In Sect. 6, we eliminate the on-line dealer. This simplifies the description and understanding of our protocols. More importantly, we prove the security of our main protocol in a modular way. In Sect. 5, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Protocol CTWithD r is an r-round m-party coin-tossing protocol with an on-line dealer tolerating up to t corrupted parties and has bias O(2 2 k+1 /r).
We then consider the on-line dealer of Protocol CTWithD r as an ideal functionality. In this protocol, the honest parties do not send any messages and in each round the dealer sends messages to the parties; we consider an interactive functionality sending the messages that the dealer sends. In Sect. 6, we prove the following theorem. Proof of Theorem 4. This theorem follows from Theorems 5 and 6 by the composition theorem of Canetti [6] . Formally, consider the (ideal) functionality F D of the dealer in Protocol CTWithD r . By Theorem 6, Protocol CTWithD r is a computationally secure implementation of F D (with full security). Consider the protocol Π F D which simply executes the functionality F D . By Theorem 5, Π F D is a 1/p-secure implemen-tation of CoinToss(). By the composition theorem of Canetti [6] , Protocol Π CTWithD r is a 1/p-secure implementation of CoinToss().
A Protocol with an On-Line Dealer
In this section we describe a protocol with a special trusted party T that acts as an online dealer interacting with the parties in rounds. The protocol consists of r rounds of interaction. In a preliminary phase, the trusted party T selects the prescribed output bit w and a special round number i * uniformly at random. In each round of interaction, the trusted party T selects a bit for each subset in a predetermined collection (this collection is part of the design of the protocol). The bits of all subsets for any round before round i * are uniformly and independently chosen; the bits of all subsets for all rounds from round i * and on all equal w. These bits are not given to honest parties. However, if the number of corrupted parties in a subset Q is larger than some predefined threshold, then the corrupted parties get the bit of Q.
In the real world these bits are secret shared. Since in the real world the adversary is rushing, the corrupted parties in the real world receive their shares before the honest parties do. Hence, in the protocol with the dealer, interaction between the parties and T in each round has three phases. In the first phase, for each subset Q that contains enough corrupted parties, the trusted party sends the bit of the subset to the corrupted parties in the subset Q. In the second phase, corrupted parties may abort the computation (and by that prevent later reconstruction of some of the information). To do so, these parties send to T an "abort" message. Finally, in the third phase, a "proceed" message is sent to the parties (this can be considered as an "ideal" secret-sharing).
The protocol proceeds normally as long as fewer than m − t parties abort. If at most t parties are active in round i, the trusted party reveals the value of the bit of some subset indexed by J in round i − 1, i.e., σ i−1 J . The subset indexed by J is chosen in a way that guarantees that the adversary does not know the value of this bit before instructing parties to abort. Jumping ahead, in the real world the subset indexed by J will also hold the additional property that the adversary cannot prevent the reconstruction of the bit of Q from round i − 1. The exact underlying subsets are specified in Fig. 3 . As an example, consider the case where m = 5 and t = 3. In this case, there are 3 underlying subsets: P 1 = {p 1 }, P 2 = {p 2 }, and P 3 = {p 3 , p 4 , p 5 } and three additional sets:
Observe that the protocol appears in Sect. 3.2 is also designed for the case of m = 5 and t = 3, but in that protocol, there are 10 sets for which the trusted party sends a value in each round. Roughly speaking, keeping the number of sets small is an important target, as there is a connection between this number and the bias of the protocol, as we explain below.
In order to simplify the presentation of this protocol, we assume that there are private channels between each party and the on-line dealer. The formal description of the protocol called CTWithD r is given in Fig. 3 . In Sects. 5.1-5.2, we prove that Protocol CTWithD r , is an O(2 2 k+1 /r)-secure protocol for computing the CoinToss() functionality. Our proof follows the real vs. ideal paradigm. We consider a malicious adversary A that corrupts at most t < 2m/3 of the parties in an execution of Protocol CTWithD r . In • The abort phase: For each party p j , upon receiving an "abort j " message from party p j , remove party p j from the list of active parties.
• The default output phase: Let D be the set of indices of parties that aborted the protocol thus far, i.e., D = {j : p j has aborted}.
to all parties and halt.
Normal termination: This phase is executed if the last round of the protocol is completed. Send w to all parties.
Instructions for honest parties: Upon receiving output y from the dealer, output y. (Honest parties do not send any message throughout the protocol.) Sect. 5.1 we present a simulator S that corrupts the same subset of parties in the ideal world with access to the trusted party T CoinToss for computing the CoinToss() functionality (that is, T CoinToss gives the same uniformly chosen bit to all parties). The simulator S has black-box access to A and at the end of the computation it outputs a view of the adversary A. In Sect. 5.2 we bound the statistical distance between the random variable describing the view of the real-world adversary A concatenated with the output of the honest parties in the appropriate execution and the random variable describing the output of the simulator S concatenated with the bit selected by the ideal-world trusted party.
The Bias of the Protocol-An Informal Argument
We next informally explain why the protocol has small bias, that is, we give a sketch of the proof of Theorem 5. First, we claim that the adversary can bias the output only if the premature termination occurs in round i * :
1. If the premature termination occurs after round i * (or does not occur at all), then the output is already fixed. Thus, the adversary can bias the output only if it guesses i * . If σ i J = σ i J for two bits that the adversary gets from the trusted party, then it can learn that i < i * . In Claim 5.4 we show that the adversary gets 2 k+1 such bits out of the 2 k+2 bits (remember that there are k + 2 subsets and bits are give to each union of these subsets). With probability 1/2 2 k+1 , all these bits are all equal in a round prior to i * and the adversary cannot distinguish such round from i * . By Claim 5.5 (originally proved in [17, Lemma 2]), this implies that the adversary can guess i * with probability at most 2 2 k+1 /r. Therefore, the bias is O(2 2 k+1 /r).
Remark 5.1. In our protocol, we construct a collection of sets Q J for J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2} and give a bit to every set Q J . Our choice of constructing these sets is not the only one possible. For example, as explained in Remark 3.1, we can use the collection of all sets of size t (this leads to a protocol with a larger bias).
The main property that is essential for achieving a coin-tossing protocol in our framework is that the collection of the sets and the corresponding thresholds satisfy the following: every set of at most t active parties that contains all honest parties can choose a set of parties Q from the collection, which has threshold o, such that there are at least o active parties in the set Q, while the number of corrupted parties in that set is less than o. Thus, in each round of the protocol, the honest parties can reconstruct a value that the corrupted parties cannot see in advance.
In Protocol CTWithD r , we construct the collection of sets by partitioning the m parties into sets P 1 , . . . , P k+2 and considering all the unions of these k + 2 sets. We can show that every partition of the m parties into α odd-sized disjoint sets, where α ≥ k + 2, leads to a valid protocol. However, we can show that constructing the collection by first partitioning the parties into disjoint sets and then taking all unions (provided that the above condition holds) yields a protocol in which the adversary can see at least 2 k+1 bits. That is, in such construction, the bias of the resulting protocol is at least the bias of Protocol CTWithD r .
To conclude, the partition approach for constructing the collection cannot improve the bias of the protocol. We do not know if there is a different approach for constructing the collection that can reduce the bias (i.e., improve the fraction of 2 2 k+1 in the bias).
The Simulator for the On-Line Dealer Protocol
We next describe our simulator S for Protocol CTWithD r . Let B be the subset of corrupted parties in the execution and A a real-world adversary corrupting them. On input (1 n , aux), the simulator S obtains w S = CoinToss() from the trusted party T CoinToss (i.e., w S is uniformly selected from {0, 1}). The simulator S internally invokes A with input (1 n , aux). S interacts with A playing the role of T , by proceeding as follows:
Simulating the preprocessing phase: S selects a bit σ i J for every subset Q J for which the corrupted parties get σ i J (i.e., for which |B ∩ Q J | ≥ o J ), and every round i as follows:
1. Selects i * ∈ {1, . . . , r} uniformly at random. 2. For each J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2}, the simulator S selects uniformly and independently at random σ 1 J , . . . , σ i * −1 J ∈ {0, 1}. 3. For each J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2}, the simulator S sets σ i * J = · · · = σ r J = w S . Simulating protocol initialization: S sends a "start" message to all corrupted parties (that is, S sends the messages for the corrupted parties to the adversary A). For each party p j , upon receiving an "abort j " message from party p j , the simulator notifies all corrupted parties that party p j has aborted. If at least m − t parties aborted, S sets i = 1 and proceeds to simulate the premature termination step. Otherwise, S sends "proceed" to all corrupted parties. Simulating interaction rounds: In each round 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the simulator S interacts with the corrupted parties, in three phases:
• The peeking phase: For each J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2}, if Q J contains at least o J corrupted parties, then S sends the bit σ i J to all corrupted parties in Q J (i.e., to the adversary).
• The abort phase: For each party p j , upon receiving an "abort j " message from party p j , the simulator notifies all parties that party p j is inactive. If at least m − t parties have aborted so far, S simulates the premature termination step.
• The main phase: S sends "proceed" to all parties.
Simulating the premature termination step: This round consists of two phases, after which the simulation terminates.
• The abort phase: For each party p j , upon receiving an "abort j " message from party p j , remove party p j from the list of active parties.
• The default output phase: Regardless of the subset of set of aborted parties, the simulator sends w S to all parties and halts the interaction with A.
Simulating normal termination:
If the last round of the protocol is completed, then S sends w S to all parties.
At the end of the interaction with A, the simulator outputs the sequence of messages exchanged between the simulator and the corrupted parties.
Proof of the Correctness of the Simulation
We consider the two random variables from Sect. 2.1, both of the form (V , C), where V describes a possible view of A, and C describes a possible output of the honest parties (i.e., C ∈ {0, 1}). The first random variable REAL CTWithD r ,A(aux) (1 n ) describes the real world-an execution of the CTWithD r protocol, where V describes the view of the adversary A in this execution, and C is the output of the honest parties in this execution. The second random variable IDEAL CoinToss(),S(aux) (1 n ) describes the ideal world-an execution with the trusted party T CoinToss , where V describes the output of the simulator S in this execution, and C is the output of the honest parties in this execution. Our goal here is to show that the statistical distance between these two random variables is O(2 2 k+1 /r), that is, to show that the protocol is perfectly O(2 2 k+1 /r) secure. For the rest of this proof, we simplify notations by omitting notations that are clear from the context. In particular, we denote the above two random variables by REAL = (V REAL , C REAL ) and IDEAL = (V IDEAL , C IDEAL ), respectively.
Lemma 5.2. For every non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A corrupting at most t < 2m/3 of the parties in Protocol
CTWithD r , for the simulator S described in Sect. 5.1 (controlling the same parties as A), for every n ∈ N and for every aux ∈ {0, 1} * , the following holds:
Proof. The flow of our proof is as follows. We first show that statistical distance between the two random variables is at most the probability that the adversary A guesses the special round i * . We do this by showing that, conditioned on the event that the adversary fails to guess round i * , the two random variables are identically distributed. Then, we bound the probability of guessing i * . We show that the adversary learns at most 2 k+1 new bits in each round. Hence, the probability that all these bits are equal in round i < i * is at least 1 2 2 k+1 . Finally, we show that this implies that the probability that of guessing i * correctly is bounded by 2 2 k+1 /r.
We consider the probability of a given pair (v, c) according to the two different random variables. For this we recall that the honest parties are deterministic in both models. We compare the two following probabilities:
1. The probability that v is the view of the adversary A in an execution of Protocol CTWithD r and c is the output of the honest parties in this execution, i.e.,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of the dealer T .
2. The probability that v is the output of the simulator S in an ideal-world execution with the trusted party T CoinToss and c is the output of the honest parties in this execution, i.e.,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of the simulator S and the random coins of the ideal-world trusted party T CoinToss .
Observe that in the simulation S follows the same instructions as the trusted party T in Protocol CTWithD r , except for two changes. First, S does not flip an internal coin to obtain w S (in contrast T chooses w at random), but rather gets w S externally from T CoinToss . However, since both w S and w are uniformly distributed, it is the same operation. The major difference is that in the case of a premature termination step, S always uses w S as its message to the corrupted parties, while T uses the bit of the appropriate subset Q J as its message. In both cases, this last message sent to the adversary is simply the output bit of the honest parties, that is, in both of the above random variables, the last message in v equals c. Hence, it is equivalent to consider the two random variables as above, where in both cases, the last message sent to the corrupted parties in the premature termination round is omitted from c. Thus, we consider the possible views v of the adversary without the last message sent to the corrupted parties.
We define a random variable PT ∈ {"before", "during", "after"} specifying whether premature termination occurred before, during, or after the special round i * . I.e., let i be the round number in which premature termination occurs (if ever); if i < i * (or if premature termination occurs during the protocol initialization step), then PT = "before", if i = i * , then PT = "during", and if i > i * or premature termination never occurs, then PT = "after". The random variable is defined both in the ideal and the real world.
In the next claim, we bound the statistical distance between the two random variables according to Definition 2.1. In order to prove this claim, we analyze the above probabilities conditioned on these three possible events: PT = "before"-Premature Termination Occurs Before Round i * We argue that in this case, both in the real protocol and in the simulation, the actions of A (according to V ) and its view before the premature termination step are independent of C (and, hence, also of the message sent to corrupted parties in the premature termination) and thus, the probabilities are exactly the same.
In a real-world execution, the output of the honest parties is the random bit for the appropriate set Q J , i.e., C REAL = σ i−1 J . This bit is independent of all other bits (since i − 1 < i * ). Hence, if A does not receive σ i−1 J from T , then this bit is completely unknown to A (before the last message is sent to the corrupted parties). This is clearly true if premature termination occurs during the protocol initialization. To see that this is also the case if premature termination occurs during round i < i * , consider the following two cases: 
The set Q J contains at most t − α < o J corrupted parties, thus, these parties do not get the bit σ i−1 J from the trusted party.
Thus, given PT = "before", the output of the honest parties is independent of the view of the adversary, hence
In the ideal-world execution, all the messages sent by the simulator in any round i < i * are independent of w S , which was the value given to S by T CoinToss . Thus,
As explained above, S follows the same random process in interacting with A (before sending the last message in the premature termination) as does T in the real-world execution. Hence,
and, thus,
PT = "after"-Premature Termination Occurs After Round i * or Never Occurs Here v must contain σ i * J for some J , which, in the real-world execution, is equal to the output bit of all sets for any round i > i * (recall that the output bit of the honest parties is determined by one such bit), and in the simulation it equals w S . Thus, in both scenarios, v must be consistent with i * and with c, hence, v completely determines c. Again, since S follows the same random process in interacting with A as does T in the real-world execution, we have
PT = "during"-Premature Termination Occurs in Round i * This is the interesting case which causes the statistical distance. In the real world, the output of the honest parties is σ i * −1 J for some J , while in the ideal world their output is w S . In the first case the output is independent of the adversary's view, while in the second case, the view determining the output.
In both scenarios, premature termination occurs in round i * and all the bits σ i * J given to the adversary in round i * must be the same (otherwise both probabilities are zero). If, however, c does not equal σ i * J that the adversary sees according to v, then we have
Otherwise, v is consistent both with i * and with c, and we have
Hence, for any pair (v, c), we have
Bounding the Statistical Distance Between the Global Outputs of the Real World and Ideal World
We next use the above analysis of the three possible cases to bound the statistical distance between the two random variables describing the global outputs of the ideal and real models. For every pair (v, c), the following holds:
Similarly,
Hence, by (1), (2), and (3), for every pair (v, c), we have
This is true since the probability that premature termination occurs in round i * , i.e., Pr[PT = "during"], is the same in both models (again, since S follows the same random process in interacting with A, before sending the last message in the premature termination, as does T in the real-world execution). Now, we are ready to conclude the proof of Claim 5.3.
Proof of Claim 5.3.

SD(IDEAL, REAL)
The last inequality is due to the properties of the probability function and the fact that c ∈ {0, 1}.
Hence, the statistical distance is bounded by the probability of the adversary guessing i * correctly (before the abort phase of round i * ). We next bound this probability by first showing that the view of the adversary in each round prior to round i * has probability 1/2 2 k+1 to be indistinguishable from i * , and then by showing that this implies that the overall probability for any adversary to guess i * is at most 2 2 k+1 /r.
If σ i J = σ i J for two bits that the adversary receives during the peeking phase of round i, then it can learn that i < i * . The information that the adversary obtains in each round are the bits σ i J for J 's such that there are enough corrupted parties in Q J (i.e., for which |B ∩ Q J | ≥ o J ). We next claim that the adversary only receives half of the 2 k+2 bits.
We remark that to obtain a total bias of O(2 2 k+2 /r) (instead of the bound of O(2 2 k+1 /r) given in Theorem 5), one may omit the following claim and use the trivial bound of 2 k+2 on the number of bits that the adversary sees in each round. The rest of our proof is independent of this claim. Hence, the reader may choose to skip the technical details of the proof of Claim 5.4 below. Altogether, there are at least 2 k−d + (2 k+1 − 2 k−d ) = 2 k+1 bits that the adversary does not see and the adversary sees at most 2 k+1 bits.
Hence, for each i < i * , with probability 1/2 2 k+1 the bits that are available to the adversary are all equal, and the adversary cannot distinguish this round from i * . It is left to show that this implies that the adversary can guess i * with probability at most 2 2 k+1 /r. Lemma 2 in [17] proves a generalization of this fact. For the sake of completeness, we include here a proof for our special case. Proof. First, recall that A is deterministic. In addition, the exact sequence of aborts by corrupted parties is immaterial. Thus, for the rest of this proof, whenever we say that A aborts in round i we mean that A instructs a large enough subset of corrupted parties to abort the computation after having seen the bits of round i or in prior rounds (and at least one party in round i).
We denote by V the set of all possible views of A ending with a premature termination. Clearly,
For 1 ≤ i ≤ r let V i ⊆ V be the set of all views for which the deterministic A aborts in round i. For a view v ∈ V i denote by v i−1 the prefix of v that A sees until round i − 1 and denote by γ i the bits that A sees in the peeking phase of round i (i.e., v = v i−1 • γ i ). Without loss of generality, we assume that for any v ∈ V i all the bits that the adversary sees in round i (i.e., γ i ) are all the same (otherwise, there exists a more successful adversary that never guesses i * with this view, because if the bits are not the same, then i = i * ). For any round i, let V i REAL be a random variable describing the view of the adversary until the end of round i.
We next consider the probabilities of the above views when i * = i and when i * = r. First, note that until round i both views happen with exactly the same probability, i.e.,
When i * = i, given the prefix of the view, there are only two possible events for the bits of round i each occurring with probability 1/2, that is, the bits the adversary sees are either all 1 or they are all 0. On the other hand, if i * > i (specifically, if i * = r), then each of these events happens with probability 1/2 α . Hence, we have for every v ∈ V i that
Combining Eqs. (6) and (7) we get for every v ∈ V i
Finally, the probability that A aborts in i * is
Concluding the Proof of Lemma 5.2 By Claim 5.3 the statistical distance between the global outputs of an ideal-world simulation and a real-world execution of the protocol is bounded by the probability that the adversary guesses the special round i * in time.
In Claim 5.5 we upper bound this probability by 2 α /r, where α is the number of bits that the adversary sees in each round of the protocol. By Claim 5.4, α ≤ 2 k+1 , thus, the statistical distance between the two random variables is upper bounded by 2 2 k+1 /r and
/r.
Omitting the On-Line Dealer
The Protocol Without the Dealer
In this section we show how Protocol CTWithD r , presented in Sect. 5, can be transformed into a real-world protocol. That is, we present a fully secure m-party protocol implementing the ideal functionality described in Protocol CTWithD r . The resulting protocol has r rounds, where r = r + c(k + 1), for some constant c. The protocol is executed in a network where the parties communicate via an authenticated broadcast channel.
In Fig. 4 we describe the initialization functionality, Functionality MultiShareGen r , which chooses i * , prepares bits for each set for each round, shares those bits, and signs them. In Fig. 5 , we present Protocol CoinToss r , which proceeds in rounds and emulates Protocol CTWithD r . Protocol CoinToss r uses a Functionality Reconstruction, described in Fig. 6 , which reconstructs the output bit if many corrupted parties have aborted. Before formally describing our construction, we outline its main components.
Functionality MultiShareGen r
Notation: 1 n -the security parameter, r = r(n) -the number of rounds in the protocol, m = m(n) -the number of parties, t = t (n) -a bound on the number of corrupted parties, and k = 2t − m -the difference between the number of corrupted parties and the number of honest parties. Underlying Subsets: Let P j = {p j } for 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1 and P k+2 = {p k+2 , . . . , p m }.
Define Q J = j ∈J P j for each J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2}. • The messages M j,1 , . . . , M j,r that p j broadcasts during the protocol.
• p j 's private masks mask j (R i,J j ) which were produced in Step (5) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r and each J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2} such that p j ∈ Q J . The Outer Secret-Sharing Scheme In the protocol with the on-line dealer, the adversary never learns anything about the bits σ i J before round i begins. To achieve this property in the real-world protocol, the shares of the inner secret-sharing schemes of all rounds are shared, in a preliminary phase, using a (t + 1)-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme. The t + 1 threshold guarantees that the adversary, controlling at most t parties, cannot see the shares of the inner secret-sharing scheme for a given round i without the honest parties, which will not occur before round i.
In each round i the parties send messages so that each party can reconstruct its shares in the inner secret-sharing schemes of round i. Since all messages are broadcast and all parties can see them, the shares that party p j receives in round i are masked by using yet another layer of secret sharing. Specifically, a share S i,J j to be reconstructed by p j in round i is signed and shared (already in the preliminary phase) in a 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing scheme, such that one share is given to p j and the other is shared among all parties in a t-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme; for details see Construction 2.8. We refer to the combination of these two layers of secret sharing as the outer secret-sharing scheme.
Premature Termination The t + 1 threshold of the outer secret-sharing scheme enables reconstruction of the shares of the inner scheme as long as at least t + 1 parties participate in the reconstruction. This allows the real-world protocol to proceed with normal interaction rounds as long as fewer than m − t parties have aborted (as does the idealworld protocol). If during round i the number of parties that have aborted is at least m − t, then an honest majority is guaranteed (since t < 2m/3). Thus, in a premature termination in round i > 1, the active parties can engage in a fully secure multiparty computation of a reconstruction functionality.
Signatures In order to confine adversarial strategies to premature aborts, the messages that the parties send are signed (together with the appropriate round number and the index of the sending party), and a verification key is given to all parties. Furthermore, all shares in the inner secret-sharing scheme are signed (as they are used as messages if reconstruction is required). Any message failing to comply with the prescribed protocol is considered an abort message. Since all messages are publicly broadcast, all parties can keep record of all aborts.
The Preliminary Phase The goal of the preliminary phase is to compute the MultiShareGen r functionality, which computes the bits for the underlying sets and the signed shares for the inner and outer secret-sharing schemes. As an honest majority is not guaranteed, it is not possible to implement this functionality by a secure protocol with fairness. That is, we cannot implement an ideal functionality where a trusted party computes the MultiShareGen r functionality and sends the appropriate output to each party. However, since the outputs of the MultiShareGen r functionality do not reveal any information regarding the output of the protocol to any subset of size at most t, fairness is not essential for this part of the computation. We use a protocol with cheat detection, that is, if the protocols fails, then at least one corrupted party is identified by all honest parties. The computation is then repeated without the detected corrupted parties.
More formally, we compute the MultiShareGen r functionality using a multiparty protocol that is secure-with-abort and cheat detection. Informally, this means that we use a protocol that implements the following ideal model: the trusted party computes the MultiShareGen r functionality and gives the outputs of the corrupted parties to the adversary; the adversary either sends "proceed", in this case, the trusted party sends the appropriate output to each honest party; otherwise, the adversary sends {"abort j "} j ∈J for some non-empty set of indices J of corrupted parties to the trusted party. The trusted party, in turn sends the set J to the honest parties. Using methods from Pass [23] , one can obtain a constant-round multiparty protocol secure-with-abort and cheat detection. See details in Appendix A. Since this protocol is repeated at most k + 1 times before an honest majority is guaranteed, the round complexity of the preliminary phase is O(k).
Proving the Feasibility of the Reconstruction
We next claim that Functionality Reconstruction described in Fig. 6 is well-defined, that is, if the functionality is computed (after premature termination in round i > 1), then, indeed, σ i−1 J can be reconstructed. To see this, observe that the number of parties in the appropriate set Q J that participate in the computation (i.e., not in D) is at least the reconstruction threshold o J . Proof. Let D be the set of aborted parties and J as defined in Functionality Reconstruction.
• If |D ∩ {k + 2, . . . , m}| ≥ m − t, then Q J = {p j : j ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ D} contains only active parties and |Q J | = o J . Notice that we already proved that in this case
The Simulator for the Protocol Without a Dealer
We next prove the security of Protocol CoinToss r and, hence, the correctness of Theorem 6. As explained in Sect. 4 we prove that this protocol is a real-world implementation of the (ideal) functionality of Protocol CTWithD r , the protocol with the on-line dealer.
We analyze Protocol CoinToss r in a hybrid model with the following three ideal implementations of the functionalities that we described before:
ShareGenWithAbort r . This is an implementation of Functionality MultiShareGen r in a secure-with-abort and cheat-detection model. That is, first Functionality MultiShareGen r is executed. Then, the adversary gets the outputs of the corrupted parties of the functionality. Next, the adversary decides whether to halt or to continue; If the adversary decides to continue, it sends a "proceed" message to Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r , which sends the honest parties their outputs. Otherwise, the adversary sends {"abort j "} j ∈J for some set of corrupted parties indexed by J , and this message is sent to the honest parties. FairCoinToss. This is an implementation with full security (with fairness) of the functionality that computes a uniformly distributed random bit. That is, the functionality simply chooses a random bit and gives it to all parties. Reconstruction. This is an implementation with full security (with fairness) of the functionality described in Fig. 6 ; this functionality is used in the premature termination step in Protocol CoinToss r for reconstructing the output bit from the shares of the previous round.
When the last two functionalities are executed, an honest majority is guaranteed, hence, these functionalities can be implemented with full security. We consider an adversary A in the hybrid model described above, corrupting t < 2m/3 of the parties that engage in Protocol CoinToss r . We next describe a simulator S interacting with the honest parties in the ideal world via a trusted party T CTWithD executing Functionality CTWithD r . The simulator S runs the adversary A internally with black-box access. Simulating A in an execution of the protocol, S corrupts the same subset of parties as does A, denoted B = {p i 1 , . . . , p i t }. At the end of the computation it outputs a possible view of the adversary A. To start the simulation, S invokes A with the auxiliary input aux and the security parameter 1 n .
Simulating the preliminary phase: Upon receiving a "start" message from the idealworld trusted party T CTWithD , the simulator S plays the role of Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r (possibly, up to m − t times), simulating the interaction between the adversary A and this functionality.
D ← ∅.
2. The simulator S prepares outputs for the corrupted parties in a single interaction with Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r . The simulator S does this by first setting σ i J = 1, for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2} and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Then, S follows Steps 3-7 in the computation of Functionality MultiShareGen r (skipping
Step (1) and Step (2)) to obtain uniformly distributed shares for the parties. 3 The simulator S keeps the key K sign for future use. 3. For each p j ∈ B, the simulator S sends to A:
• The verification key K ver .
• The masking shares mask j (R 1. S gets from the trusted party T CTWithD the bits that the corrupted parties see, that is, S gets a bit τ i J for each J ∈ J B 0 . 4 2. The simulator S selects the shares in the inner secret-sharing scheme for corrupted parties: For every J ∈ J B 0 , the simulator S selects uniformly at random shares of τ i J in an o J -out-of-|Q J | Shamir secret-sharing scheme. 3 These shares are temporary and will later be opened to the actual bits obtained from T CTWithD during the interaction rounds using the properties of Shamir's secret-sharing scheme; specifically, they can alternatively be computed by setting σ i J to 0. 4 In Steps 2-5, the simulator S constructs the messages of the honest parties in order to allow the corrupted Simulating the premature termination step:
• If i = 1, S simulates A's interaction with Functionality FairCoinToss as follows:
1. The simulator S gets from T CTWithD the bit σ . Then, S sends σ to A.
• If i > 1, S simulates A's interaction with Functionality Reconstruction as follows:
1. S receives from A the inputs of the active corrupted parties in the current round denoted by B i . If the input for p j ∈ B i is not appropriately signed, then S sends "abort j " to T CTWithD . 2. S gets from T CTWithD a bit σ and sends it to A.
Simulating normal termination at the end of round r:
1. The simulator gets w from the trusted party T CTWithD . 2. S constructs all the singed shares of the inner secret-sharing scheme for each J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2} and for each honest party p j ∈ Q J as follows.
• For each J ∈ J B 0 , the signed shares {Y r,J j } were produced in
Step (2) The Output of the Simulator: The simulator S outputs r A and the sequence of messages exchanged between S and the adversary A and halts.
Proof of the Correctness of the Simulation
In this section we prove that the simulator described in Sect. 6.2 simulates Protocol CoinToss r described in Sect. 6.1. We consider the two random variables from Sect. 2.1, both of the form (V , C), where V describes a possible view of A, and C describes a possible output of the honest parties (i.e., C ∈ {0, 1}). The first random variable REAL CoinToss r ,A(aux) (1 n ) describes the hybrid world, i.e., an execution of the CoinToss r protocol in the above hybrid model, where V describes the view of the adversary A in this execution, and C is the output of the honest parties in this execution. The second random variable IDEAL CTWithD r ,S(aux) (1 n ) describes the output of the simulator and the honest parties in the ideal world, i.e., an execution of the r-round m-party cointossing protocol CTWithD r with an on-line dealer, where V describes the output of the simulator S in this execution, and C is the output of the honest parties in this execution. Our goal here is to show that the these two random variables are computationally indistinguishable. For the rest of this proof, we simplify notations by omitting all notations that are clear from the context; we denote the above two random variables by REAL = (V REAL , C REAL ) and IDEAL = (V IDEAL , C IDEAL ), respectively. In the main part of the proof, we assume that an adversary never (successfully) forges a signature during the execution of the protocol. Under this assumption, we prove that these two random variables are identically distributed. Since the probability that a polynomial-time adversary successfully forges a signature for any message is negligible, the statistical distance between these two random variables is negligible.
We next prove a slightly stronger claim than the one required for the above. We define two random variables KEY IDEAL and KEY REAL representing the sequence of signing keys used in the (repeated) iterations of the preliminary phase to sign the messages. That is, KEY IDEAL represents the sequence of keys that were used to sign the messages in the computations of Step (2) during a given execution of the simulation, and KEY REAL represents the sequence of keys that were used to sign the messages in the computations of Step (2a) Proof. The simulator follows the same procedure for generating the messages to corrupted parties as the protocol with one main difference. The simulator chooses σ i J = 1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r and J ⊂ {1, . . . , k + 2}, while the protocol chooses these values at random. However, since the adversary holds at most t shares of Construction 2.8 with threshold t + 1 (i.e., α = t + 1), these shares are uniformly distributed (as explained in Construction 2.8). Thus, the probability that the adversary sees the shares that are consistent with λ is the same in both models. As the messages sent to the corrupted parties are these shares and signatures on these shares, the claim follows. + and, thus, are both consistent with λ. We, thus, assume that round i does take place according to λ.
The messages broadcast in round i are shares in the outer secret-sharing schemes of shares generated in an inner secret-sharing scheme. We will show that in both worlds the hybrid and the ideal, they are distributed according to the same distribution. The selection of the bits that the adversary sees throughout the protocol is done by the same process in the real protocol (by Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r ) and in the ideal world (by the trusted dealer). That is, in both cases the bits are selected according to the algorithm defined by Functionality MultiShareGen r . Furthermore, given these values, each bit is shared independently of the other bits. Thus, it suffices to show that the outer shares of each bits are equally distributed. There are two cases:
Outer shares for p j ∈ B 0 and J ∈ J B 0 such that j ∈ J . Since J ∈ J B 0 , the simulator gets from the trusted party T CTWithD a bit τ i J . The simulator then generates shares of an inner secret-sharing scheme of τ i J , and signs these shares. Let Y i,J j be the share of p j generated by the simulator. This share is generated in the same process as the share R Outer shares for p j / ∈ B 0 or J / ∈ J B 0 . In the hybrid world, first the value σ i J is chosen in Functionality MultiShareGen r , then this bit is shared in an inner secret-sharing scheme, signed, and shared in an outer secret-sharing scheme. In the ideal world, the process is similar, however, for the fixed bit σ i J = 1.
• If p j / ∈ B 0 , the parties in B 0 miss the mask of R i,J j , thus, they cannot see the difference between the worlds.
• If J / ∈ J B 0 , the number of parties in B 0 that are in Q J is fewer than o J . Thus, the inner shares given to the parties in Q J ∩ B 0 are equally distributed regardless of the value of σ i J , and their sharing in the outer secret-sharing scheme is equally distributed in the two worlds.
The Termination Step
We next prove that the random variables are equally distributed after the termination (premature or normal). Proof. We need to show that the probabilities that in both worlds, the view of the adversary A in the termination phase is consistent with λ, given that everything else was consistent with λ is the same in both worlds. We consider the two possible types of termination of the protocol, i.e., normal termination and premature termination. The type of termination we need to consider is specified by the view in previous round, and, thus, by REAL r + and IDEAL r + . We therefore consider the type of termination as specified by λ.
A premature termination step is specified by λ: We separate the analysis of this case into two. First, we consider the case where the premature termination takes place with i = 1. Then, we consider the case where 1 < i ≤ r. In all of the cases discussed below, at least m − t parties have aborted, and, thus, an honest majority is guaranteed among the remaining active parties.
1. The case where i = 1 (according to λ): This case is possible either if according to λ at least m − t parties aborted in the preliminary phase, or m − t parties aborted before the first round of interaction was completed. By the definition of the premature termination step, in both the above cases the output of the protocol should be a uniform bit that is independent of the view of the adversary. We next claim that both in the hybrid world and in the simulation this is indeed the case. Formally, we claim that given that the view of the adversary (as well as the sequence of signing keys used thus far) is consistent with λ, the view of the adversary in the premature termination step will consist of an independent uniform bit, both in the hybrid world and in the simulation.
In the premature termination step in the hybrid world, the parties use Functionality FairCoinToss to toss a completely fair coin (the functionality is fully secure, since an honest majority is guaranteed). In the simulation, the simulator S sends an "abort j " message to T CTWithD for each party p j that has aborted. Then, S gets in return a bit σ and sends σ to A. By the definition of Protocol CTWithD r the trusted party will return w = σ 0 J , for some subset J . Regardless of the exact subset, this bit is uniform and independent of the view of the adversary. 2. The case where 1 < i ≤ r (according to λ): We claim that in this case the output of the honest parties (which is part of the view of the adversary) is the bit σ i−1 J for the same subset J , both in the hybrid world and in the simulation. This suffices, since, as explained above, the bits for all sets are selected according to the same randomized process in the real protocol (by Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r ) and in the ideal world (by the trusted dealer). Thus, given that the same view for the adversary.
In the hybrid world the parties execute Functionality Reconstruction to select the appropriate bit (the functionality is fully secure, since an honest majority is guaranteed). In the ideal world the simulator turns to the trusted party T CTWithD for the output bit. In both cases the bit is chosen according to the set D of parties that have aborted the protocol. By the assumption that the view of A thus far is consistent with λ, we see that the set of parties that aborted before the beginning of the premature termination step has started is the same in both models. Now, all inputs of corrupted party to Functionality Reconstruction are going to be the same both in the hybrid world and in the simulation, thus the subset D is going to be the same. Therefore, in both models, the same subset J is going to be selected, and by the above the same bit is going to be output.
A normal termination step is specified by λ: According to specification of Protocol CTWithD r , at the end of round r, each party p j broadcasts its (signed) shares in the inner secret-sharing scheme of round r, i.e., party p j broadcasts R r,J j for each J such that p j ∈ Q J . Thus, in the hybrid world, the adversary will receive the shares sent by the honest parties. To simulate the messages sent by the honest parties in this case, the simulator S gets the output bit w from the trusted party T CTWithD , selects inner secret-sharing schemes shares for the honest parties, and signs them. That is, S selects for each honest party p j shares {X r,J j } and then concatenates the corresponding identifying details, and signs them to obtain {Y r,J j }. We first consider the issue of the output bit itself. If J B 0 = ∅, that is, that the adversary learns at least on bit in each round, then, the output bit is completely determined by the bits that the adversary saw in round r, hence, REAL r + and IDEAL r + both determine (and agree on) the output bit w. If the adversary does not learn any bit in round r (and, hence, it does not learn any bits in any other round), then the view of the adversary is completely independent of the value of the output bit and since in both worlds this bit is uniform, the probability that it agrees with λ is 1/2 in both cases. We continue our analysis under the added assumption that (besides REAL r + and IDEAL r + being consistent with λ) the prescribed output bit in both worlds is consistent with λ. That is, we assume that the bit w that S obtains from the trusted party T CTWithD is the same as the output bit selected by Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r , and that they both agree with λ. We next claim that, under the above assumptions (i.e., conditioned on REAL r + and IDEAL r + and the output bit in each model being consistent with λ), the probability in both models that the adversary sees shares (of honest parties) for the output bit that are according to λ is the same. By the properties of the Shamir secret-sharing scheme, the shares of the honest parties for the bits of sets J ∈ J B 0 (i.e., such that |B 0 ∩ Q J | ≥ o J ) are completely determined by the view of the adversary, i.e., by the shares of corrupted parties for these bits (since any o J shares determine the other shares in a Shamir o J -out-of-|Q J | scheme). Hence, these shares will be consistent with λ with probability 1 in both models. We note that this is true, since the selection of shares is done properly in both model (specifically, in the simulation, the shares for honest parties X r,J j were already selected in the simulation of round r, together with the shares of corrupted parties). For the remaining shares, i.e., shares of honest parties p j and subsets J / ∈ J B 0 , we argue that in both models they are uniformly distributed over all shares that complete those seen by the adversary to be secret shares of the output bit w. This is true since the shares that the adversary sees for this bit do not determine its value and by the properties of secret-sharing schemes. Thus, the distribution over the shares of honest parties p j and subsets J / ∈ J B 0 is the same in both models, given the set of shares of corrupted parties for these bits. That is, selecting uniformly over all shares X r,J j for honest parties that complete the shares of the corrupted parties (which are specified by λ) to a sharing of w (as is done by the simulator) is equivalent to uniformly selecting shares for all parties to share w and then selecting uniformly over those for which the shares of corrupted parties agree with λ (which describes the distribution over shares, implied by the hybrid-world random variable).
So far we considered the correctness of the simulation process, however, in order to argue that the protocol is secure, we also need to verify that the simulator can be implemented by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm.
Claim 6.5. The simulator S described in Sect. 6.2 is efficient.
Proof. The simulator uses the adversary in a black-box manner and never rewinds it. Furthermore, the adversary is itself a (non-uniform) polynomial-time algorithm. In addition, the simulator needs to simulate Functionality ShareGenWithAbort r (at most m − t times), Functionality FairCoinToss (at most once), and Functionality Reconstruction (at most once). Since all three functionalities are polynomial-time computable, their simulation is efficient. Finally, in each round of the simulation (and in the simulation of a normal termination) the simulator needs to select uniformly distributed shares of the bits that the adversary sees. By the properties of Construction 2.8, this can be done efficiently. In addition, in each round of the simulation the simulator needs to sign these shares, which is also done in polynomial time since it holds the signing key. Hence, since the number of rounds in the protocol is polynomial in the security parameter, the whole simulation is done in polynomial time.
Concluding the Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Theorem 6. In Sect. 6.2 we describe an ideal-world simulator for any hybridworld adversary for Protocol CoinToss r . By the combination of Claims 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, we see that, under the assumption that the adversary never forges a signature of a message, for any pair (v, c), the probability that REAL = (v, c) is exactly the same as the probability that IDEAL = (v, c). That is, the global outputs of an ideal-world simulation and of a hybrid-world execution are identically distributed under the above assumption. As explained above, since the probability to successfully forge a signature for any message is negligible, the above two random variables are statistically close even without the assumption that the adversary never successfully forges any message. Finally, by Claim 6.5 the simulator is efficient.
The analysis of the security of Protocol CoinToss r is done relative to an hybrid world with three ideal functionalities. By Canetti [6] , the real-world protocol is computationally secure if computationally secure real-world implementations of these three functionalities exist. This is indeed the case if enhanced trapdoor permutations exist. Hence, the theorem follows.
Coin-Tossing Protocol for any Constant Fraction of Corrupted Parties
In this section we describe a coin-tossing protocol for any constant fraction of corrupted parties and we prove the following theorem. Before our work, the best known protocol for this scenario is an extension of Blum's two-party coin-tossing protocol [5] to an r-round m-party protocol that has bias O(t/ √ r − t) [2, 8] . In this protocol, in each round i of the protocol, the parties jointly select a random bit σ i in two phases. In the first phase, each party commits to a "private" random bit, and in the second phase the private bits are all revealed and the output bit σ i is taken to be the XOR of all private bits. The output of the whole protocol is the value of the majority of the σ i 's. When there is an abort in round i, the remaining parties repeat the computation of round i and continue with the prescribed computation.
Intuitively, the best strategy for a rushing adversary to bias the output of the protocol, say toward 0, is in each round i to instruct a corrupted party to abort before the completion of the revealing phase if σ i = 1. This is possible since the rushing adversary learns σ i before the completion of round i, specifically, a corrupted party can delay its message until all honest parties reveal their bit. This can go on at most t times, resulting in a total bias of O(t/( √ r − t)) = O(t/ √ r), whenever r = Ω(t 2 ). In our protocol, we follow the general structure of the above protocol in computing the σ i 's and taking the majority over them. However, we compute each σ i using a secure-with-abort and cheat-detection protocol, such that either the computation is completed or at least a constant fraction of the corrupted parties abort (specifically, m − t corrupted parties abort).
Next, we briefly describe the computation of each σ i in our protocol. We show how to obtain a constant-round secure-with-abort and cheat-detection protocol to compute a random bit that identifies at least m − t cheating parties. Let m i be the number of active parties at the beginning of round i and t i be an upper bound on the number of active corrupted parties at the beginning of round i (that is, if t parties have aborted in rounds 1, . . . , i − 1, then t i = t − t ). We use a constant-round secure-with-abort and cheatdetection protocol. Such a protocol exists under reasonable cryptographic assumptions. More details appear in Appendix A.
In the first phase, a preprocessing phase, the active parties execute a constant-round secure-with-abort and cheat-detection protocol to compute a (t i + 1)-out-of-m i secret sharing of a random bit σ i . That is, at the end of this phase, each party holds a share in a (t i + 1)-out-of-m i Shamir secret-sharing scheme of σ i . To confine adversarial strategies to aborts, the share that each party receives is signed and a verification key is given to all parties. In a second phase, a revealing phase, all parties reveal their shares and reconstruct σ i . In the reveal phase, broadcasting anything other than a signed share is treated as abort. The formal description of the protocol appears in Fig. 7 .
To see that the above protocol achieves the required properties, observe that after the first phase the adversary cannot reconstruct σ i . Thus, by aborting the preprocessing round, corrupted parties cannot bias the output. We stress that they are able to cause the preprocessing phase to fail, at the cost of at least one corrupted party being detected by all honest parties. In such a case, the preprocessing stage is repeated without the detected party. This, however, can only happen at most t times in total, throughout the whole protocol.
In the revealing phase, a rushing adversary can learn σ i before the corrupted parties broadcast their messages and, thus, can bias the output by not broadcasting these messages. However, by the properties of the secret-sharing scheme, at least m i − t i parties have to not broadcast their message, and, hence, effectively abort the computation. Hence, the adversary cannot do this too many times throughout the protocol. The next claim bounds the maximal number of bits the adversary could learn during the protocol. Proof. In each round i, a (t i + 1)-out-of-m i Shamir secret-sharing scheme is used for sharing σ i , therefore, m i − t i parties have to abort in order to prevent reviling σ i . However, recall that m i − t i is a lower bound on the number of honest parties, therefore, m − t = m 1 − t 1 = m 2 − t 2 = · · ·. Hence, the number of parties that have to abort in order to prevent the honest parties from reviling the bit is constant times m and equals the number of honest parties. Assume that the adversary prevented the honest parties of learning the bits of x rounds and after it an honest majority is achieved. Therefore, after an abort of at least x(m − t) corrupted parties, we have t x ≤ t − x(m − t) and m x ≤ m − x(m − t). As an honest majority is achieved, i.e., t x < m x /2, then the following inequity holds:
By multiplying by two and moving sides, we get the following inequality: 2t − m < x(m − t).
applies the compilation technique of Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [7] (which, in turn, follows the paradigm of [12] ) to the constant-round semi-honest protocol of [3] . Thus, Pass's results [23] imply a constant-round multiparty secure-with-abort computation for any feasible functionality. However, this protocol does not immediately imply the ability to detect cheating. Pass [23] considers a setting where the parties are connected through a point-to-point asynchronous public network. To realize the IDEAL 1:M ZK functionality, he reduces the usage of the IDEAL 1:M ZK functionality to the usage of the more standard two-party ideal zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality, IDEAL ZK (i.e., a functionality that models interaction between a single prover and single verifier). The idea underlying this reduction is similar to the idea used by Goldwasser and Lindell [13] to implement a broadcast channel in a similar setting. However, as is the case with the protocol of [13] , this step does not yield the ability to detect cheating since a corrupted party can cause the protocol to terminate without revealing its identity. Fortunately, we can overcome this problem by using a broadcast channel as well as a synchronous network, thus, simplifying the reduction to IDEAL ZK to requiring each party to prove in zero-knowledge the same statement to each of the other parties (while other parties monitor the interaction). Furthermore, to verify that the resulting protocol has the ability to detect cheating, it suffices to observe that the zero-knowledge protocols of Pass satisfy the two abovementioned properties of perfect completeness and public verifiability. 5 
